Though a compassionate individual is naturally inclined to help those in need, others who by nature possess fortitude aren’t as sensitive to the existence of suffering, and since they aren’t impelled subjectively or objectively to help, they will not help. Utilitarians claim that refusing to aid those in need is immoral, as it doesn’t maximize the benefits to those involved. However, certain moral systems—like utilitarianism—utilize subjective factors, which render the systems unfair and not motivating for certain rational beings. Furthermore, utilitarianism strives to promote the greatest happiness for the greatest number, but happiness is merely a natural object of inclination, and acting on an inclination has no moral worth. Happiness is also indeterminate as a notion: when you are poor, you identify happiness with wealth, and when you are sick, you identify happiness with health, and so happiness is not a practical goal. To avoid this, one must create a deontological moral system that derives morality from reason, which would bring about uniformly applicable, useful, and motivating principles of morality for rational beings.
For Kant, one can determine what is moral with synthetic a priori judgements, or pure practical reasoning. When morality is determined by pure practical reasoning—which is devoid of all subjective viewpoints—moral principles may be applied universally. This moral system, as devised by Kant, is the categorical imperative (CI).
After a will is motivated by duty and deprived of every subjective impulse, the will becomes a Good Will. As duty requires obeying moral laws, rational beings with Good Will are directed by these universal laws—laws that are only universal and objective because they can be shared by all rational beings. A rational being with Good Will, being objective, would thus strive to conform its actions to moral laws. According to Kant, the consequences of an action is irrelevant, as all actions motivated by the Good Will are good (since they were made out of respect for moral laws), and so he uses this to present his first formulation of the categorical imperative (CI1), known as the Formula of Universality and the Law of Nature:
To realize one’s duty, one must test how one’s maxim complies with the CI1. If one’s maxim cannot be conceived as a universal law without contradiction—a type of contradiction called a contradiction in conception—then we have the perfect duty to not act by this maxim. Regarding the false promise example, Kant claims that when one borrows money knowing that one can’t return it, then one evokes a contradiction in conception by universalizing the maxim, “one can make a lying promise”. In the perturbed social world (PSW)—a world where the proposed maxim is universalized—no one would believe each other, and so promises wouldn’t exist. By conceiving a world where everyone made lying promises, no one would be able to make promises, and so there is a contradiction in conception. Deducing this, Kant claims that we have a perfect duty to never make lying promises. On the other hand, if one’s maxim passes the contradiction in conception test but fails to be willed as a universal law without contradiction—known as contradiction in the will—then we have the imperfect duty to not act by this maxim. According to Kant, universalizing the maxim, “don’t aid others in need”, creates a contradiction in the will. We’re all rational beings who desire things we need, but in the PSW, when one needs aid from others, one cannot receive needed assistance, which is self-defeating. Though one can conceive a world where no one aids those in need (so there is no contradiction in conception), one wills a PSW which one cannot be a part of (or survive in, for the matter, as one needs to be fed as an infant, treated when in an accident), and so a contradiction in the will is reached. With this conclusion, Kant would claim that we have an imperfect duty to sometimes help others in need.
The principle of contradiction that Kant seeks for is debated among philosophers; the three main principles advocated for are logical contradictions, teleological contradictions, and practical contradictions. A logical contradiction is an inconceivable concept, like a married bachelor. If universalizing a maxim creates a logical impossibility, then there’s a logical contradiction. Teleological contradictions occur when maxims and their universalized forms violate or oppose natural purposes of the elements—such as “any organ, instinct, or action-type” (Korsgaard 500)—involved in the maxims. In a practical contradiction, a maxim becomes self-defeating once universalized, when one’s will disallows achieving what one intended to achieve. As stated by Korsgaard, this is when “your action would become ineffectual for the achievement of your purpose if everyone (tried to) use it for that purpose”.
Using two other examples—one being the perfect duty to not kill someone to receive a job, and the other an imperfect duty to develop one’s own talents—we may demonstrate that the principle Kant had in mind is practical contradictions. Logically, killing doesn’t lead to a contradiction in conception, as killing—like other natural acts, and unlike conventional acts (for example, making lying promises)—can be universalized without rendering itself logically impossible, or even universalized without decreasing the efficiency in reaching its intended purpose, and so it doesn’t create a logical contradiction (Korsgaard 507). In a PSW where everyone kills to receive a job, there exists no logical impossibility, but there is a thwarting of the intended purpose, since an agent who receives a job after killing will also be killed, and so the agent no longer exists to take on the job. Since this is self-defeating, there is a practical contradiction. As to a PSW where people don’t develop their own talents, a logical impossibility doesn’t occur, since one can conceive and will such a world without reaching a contradiction. In the PSW, people will still exist and be able to live satisfactory lives. To continuously live satisfactory lives, people engage in activities that may only be achieved with talent, but the PSW denies the development of such talents, and so people cannot continuously live satisfactory lives. Since living satisfactorily requires not developing talents, which sabotages living satisfactory lives, there’s a practical contradiction. On another note, it cannot be declared that the purpose of human existence is to develop talents and receive greater happiness, as humans are also best-suited to create pain and destruction. Our purpose may be to follow duties, to maximise others’ happiness, or a purpose may simply not exist. Thus, a teleological contradiction either cannot be identified or doesn’t exist. With this, it’s evident that Kant utilizes practical contradictions to evaluate how maxims compare to the CI1.
Though one of Kant’s goals is to show that absolute rationality includes total compliance with the CI, one cannot say that immoral actions are irrational just because they fail the test of the CI, or more specifically, because their universalized maxim leads to a contradiction. The contradiction of universalized maxims doesn’t prove the contradiction of maxims, and so the immoral actions themselves—which are the results of the maxims—cannot be proven as irrational in such a way. If, using the CI1, a maxim—
Indeed, if one states the CI1 as, “you shall act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law”, it becomes obvious that the CI1 is a synthetic proposition, as a maxim is not by definition willed as a universal law. Similarly, if one states Kant’s Formula of Humanity, or the second formulation of the CI (CI2)—So act that you use humanity, in your own person as well as in the person of any other, always at the same time as end, never merely as a means—as “you shall use humanity never merely as a means”, the CI2 also seems synthetic, as, unlike an analytic statement (“all bachelors are unmarried”), its predicate isn’t contained in its subject. Kant argues that all rational beings deserve respect, but this isn’t analytically true, or one would contradict oneself by denying the statement. Since the CI1 and CI2 both utilize synthetic knowledge, they are similar in that respect.
Nonetheless, the CI1 and CI2 are distinct as shown by the different moral conclusions they reach. Kant claims that we have a perfect duty to not commit suicide, in which committing suicide is a form of self-love, as it prevents future suffering. He argues that by killing oneself out of self-love—self-love being the emotion that sustains life—a contradiction in conception is formed. However, a PSW where everyone who wished to avoid suffering committed suicide doesn’t create a logical impossibility, and so there isn’t a logical contradiction. In the same world, the purpose of suicide wouldn’t become ineffectual, and so there isn’t a practical contradiction. On the other hand, one may claim that the existence of self-love serves to prolong life, and since self-love’s natural purpose also serves to end life in the suicide’s case, there’s a teleological contradiction. As Korsgaard puts it, the contradiction arises because “a mechanism designed for the protection of life is malfunctioning”. Yet, the suicide herself doesn’t desire the functioning of the mechanism, and with this attitude, remains indifferent to the malfunctioning of others’ self-love, and so there also aren’t teleological contradictions in the PSW. While there isn’t a contradiction in conception, a contradiction in the will is invoked, since committing suicide frustrates the projects one want to achieve. Therefore, one only has an imperfect duty to not take one’s own life. However, not committing suicide would conclude as a perfect duty if evaluated using the CI2. For Kant, not treating oneself or others as a means is a perfect duty, and in the example, committing suicide is using oneself as a means, as one uses oneself to live until deciding to die. Interestingly, while the CI2 evaluates not committing suicide as a perfect duty, the CI1 only views it as an imperfect duty.
This disparity arises in other circumstances as well. Using the fat man example of the trolley problem, the CI1 and CI2 also lead to different conclusions. The CI2 gives a straightforward answer: by pushing and killing the fat man to save the five others in the path of the trolley, you use him as a means and don’t respect his humanity. Therefore, it’s a perfect duty to not push the fat man. Unlike a PSW where people kill others to take their jobs, one cannot find a contradiction in conception when using the CI1 to universalize the maxim, “you shall kill when killing minimalizes the loss of life”, as the maxim isn’t self-defeating when universalized. When you kill and receive a job in the PSW, you ensure that you won’t have a job, as you will then be killed, but in the other PSW, you will achieve your maxim—that is, killing to save lives—and still possibly achieve that maxim in the future. Since killing to save lives can be thought as a universal law without contradiction, it isn’t a perfect duty to not kill to save lives.
Perhaps, the maxim is too specific and should be altered to, “you shall minimalize the loss of life”. If I was in the fat man’s position and followed this new maxim, I’d have to jump in the trolley’s path, effectively saving the five by committing suicide. However, by doing so, I’d violate the imperfect duties to develop my talents and to not commit suicide. Since a PSW can be conceived where everyone act to minimalize the loss of life when it may be done so, there is no contradiction in conception. Thus, there’s only an imperfect duty to minimalize the loss of life. Yet again, though killing yourself to prevent others’ deaths asserts the value of humanity (and, as a result, the value of yourself), the CI2—when followed literally—concludes that there is a perfect duty to not minimalize the loss of life, as you would be using yourself as a means to save the five by committing suicide.
In terms of moral conclusions the CI1 and CI2 produce, Kant’s formulations are radically disparate. Though the two formulations of the CI possess different practical implications, they are nonetheless individually worthy evaluators in moral situations.
Works Cited:
Kant, Immanuel. Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. Edited by Jens Timmermann and
Mary Gregor, Cambridge University Press, 2012.
Korsgaard, Christine. “Kant’s Formula of Universal Law.” Ethical Theory: An Anthology, ed.
Russ Shafer-Landau, Wiley-Blackwell, 2012, pp. 499-509
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